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Abstract 
Whilst the same group differences can be explained in many ways, explanations of group 
differences tend to spontaneously figure the distinctive attributes of lower-status groups 
against a background norm of high-status groups’ attributes.  We suggest that this asymmetry 
occurs in the explanations of scientists and laypeople  because of ‘disciplinary power’ and 
works to disempower lower-status people by making them visible to the human sciences. We 
argue that social groups who are habitually studied first in research programs, more 
commonly encountered social groups, and prototypical social groups are all less likely than 
their counterparts to be marked in spontaneous explanations of empirical group differences.  
We present evidence that groups who are explicitly mentioned in such explanations are 
assumed to be lower in power. We describe some limitations to current knowledge about 
such asymmetric explanations and  suggest some directions for further research, including 
our thoughts about how to integrate existing findings with the possibility of formulating 
cognitive alternatives to the status quo among minority groups. 
 
Introduction 
 Social psychologists have long been aware that the same social event can be interpreted 
in many ways. People can construct the same action as typical of the actor or specific to the 
situation (Maass, 1999) or describe their personal histories as tragedies or triumphs (Ross & 
Wilson, 2003). Scientists must also choose how to construct the meanings of results.  But 
scientists’ accounts are special, because those accounts are often presented and interpreted as 
'objective truths' that cannot be influenced by individual, group, or systemic political interests 
(Shapin, 1996).  In this article, we engage with this description of science by describing some 
systematic ways that lay and scientific descriptions of differences between social groups are 
skewed, and some important consequences of those skewed descriptions.  
 Psychologists' accounts of group differences have contributed to inequalities in the 
past.  Happily, psychological studies of ‘race’ and intelligence, of women’s capacity to do 
particular jobs, and of the ‘adjustment’ of gay and lesbian people are all topics that students 
learn about only in their history of psychology classes. However, we argue that contemporary 
scientists’ practices of interpreting evidence about group differences continue to selectively 
privilege Whites, men, and heterosexuals in subtle but systematic ways. We first summarize 
empirical findings showing that laypersons and psychologists alike explain group differences 
by making lower-status groups the figure and higher-status groups the background for 
comparison. We then suggest a framework for understanding why this effect occurs.   Our 
framework includes factors that range from distal to proximal causes, including historical 
contexts, communication pragmatics, learning processes and category activation.  We also 
explain how groups are advantaged or disadvantaged when they are positioned as the 
background norm for comparison or the figural ‘effect to be explained.’  
 
Figure-Ground Relationships in Explanations 
 Our research draws on the Gestalt principle that it is possible to impose different figure-
ground relationships on the same external stimulus.  We have studied figure-ground 
relationships within accounts of empirical differences between social groups. Experiments 
with US college students have shown a preference to focus explanations of differences upon 
lower-status groups against a background of higher-status groups.  When Miller, Taylor, and 
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Buck (1991) presented such participants with results of studies that showed gender 
differences in political behavior, both women and men participants in these studies focused 
their explanations of those gender differences more frequently on women than on men.  That 
is to say, the participants explained gender differences more often as being ‘about women’ 
than ‘about men’; women’s attributes were made figural and men’s attributes were made the 
background norm for comparison.  Later studies extended this finding beyond the domain of 
gender, showing that sexual identity differences are most often explained as being about 
gay/lesbian people more than about straight people (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004), and 
‘race’ differences as being about African-Americans more than about European-Americans 
(Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmaros, 2007).  These asymmetries are large; typically only 1/4 of 
explanation content focuses on higher-status groups in such studies (Pratto, Hegarty et al., 
2007).   
Asymmetric explanations are not only observed in experiments, they are also visible 
in scientific discourse. Hegarty and Buechel (2006) coded descriptions and explanations of 
gender difference findings in 40 years of articles published in four journals of the American 
Psychological Association.  Both women and men authors explained gender differences by 
making women and girls the figure and men and boys the background, albeit to a lesser 
extent than in the  experimental studies described above Because experiments with lay 
participants and studies of scientific reporting have shown figure-ground biases in the 
explanations of both men and women (Miller et al., 1991; Hegarty & Buechel, 2006), this 
body of research suggests that biases in explanatory focus can best be described as focusing 
on lower-status groups rather than on outgroups.  Below we  review evidence that these 
biases can be seen as resulting from history, communication pragmatics, learning and 
knowledge activation.   
 
Disciplinary Power 
 We begin by suggesting a historical reason why explanations might locate the causes of 
differences in some groups’ characteristics more than in others’. These asymmetries bear on 
the form of power that Foucault (1975/1995) called “disciplinary power.”  Foucault described 
a transformation in the form of social power that occurred when ‘Western’ societies began to 
apply the scientific method to studying humans in the 19th century. Whilst the earlier 
sovereign mode of power relied upon the often visible exercise of the power of monarchs, 
disciplinary power works through making people visible.  People who are ‘disciplined’ are 
disempowered by being made visible,  so that it is easier for institutions to selectively act on 
those individuals in a manner that appears objective, rational and fair. At the same time, 
disciplinary power makes those who exercise the power less visible by justifying their actions 
as rational. To exemplify disciplinary power, Foucault described Jeremy Bentham’s design of 
the ‘panopticon,’ an idealized prison with a radial architecture in which myriad prisoners 
could all be observed in their individual cells from a central observing tower, whilst no 
prisoner could ever be sure when they were being observed.   
 The emergence of disciplinary power provides one historical explanation of why 
scientists and laypeople in the West might explain group differences in asymmetric ways 
(Hegarty & Buechel, 2006; Pratto, Hegarty et al., 2007); such people live in a cultural context 
where people who are described by the human sciences have historically been disempowered.  
Foucault saw the invention of disciplinary power as entrenching existing status differences.  
He noted that:  
 
 In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient  
 more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and  
 the non-delinquent (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 193).   
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The finding that such asymmetries occur in scientists’ explanations (c.f., Hegarty & Buechel, 
2006) renders their comparison to Foucault’s disciplinary power all the more compelling. 
Foucault used the term ‘disciplinary’ both because this form of power lead individuals to 
internalize the discipline of institutions, such as panopticons, and because this form of power 
generated academic disciplines such  as criminology, education, and psychiatry which 
justified treating people differently and subjecting them to surveillance in institutions.  
Indeed, Hegarty and Buechel’s (2006) observations of asymmetric explanations in 
psychological science are particularly relevant to Foucault’s claim that “[a]ll the sciences, 
analyses or practices employing the root ‘psycho-’ have their origins in this historical reversal 
of the procedures of individualization” (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 193). 
 Large asymmetries in people’s explanations of group differences may evidence 
processes that have their origins in disciplinary power.  It is important to note that Foucault 
defined ‘power’ differently from the common definition of power in social psychology as the 
capacity to influence other people (e.g., Fiske, 1993).  Simon and Oakes (2006) have 
similarly described power as a process, and usefully distinguished between seemingly static 
status group differences, and processes of power that melt and freeze those differences. Their 
social identity perspective usefully incorporates Foucault’s insight that power consists of 
processes by which status differences might be reproduced or broken down.  Similarly, we 
argue that the focus on lower-status groups in explanations constitutes a form of power, 
through which status differences are communicated and reified.  We think such power 
processes that work through scientific knowledge are worth studying because they operate 
invisibly and seem legitimate, and because it seems possible to interrupt them with individual 
and collective effort.  
 
Why are Explanations of Group Differences Asymmetric? 
 Whilst Foucault’s description of the emergence of disciplinary power provides a broad 
historical explanation of asymmetries in explanations of group differences, it says little about 
the more proximal processes by which status differences might affect the contents of 
individual’s (scientific) explanations.  In this section we suggest three reasons why groups 
might habitually become figural or background in people’s explanations. These factors are 
loosely associated with status; (1) some groups are studied earlier than others in research 
programs (2) some groups are encountered more frequently than others, and (3) some groups 
are deemed more prototypical of general categories than are others.   
 
 Who is Studied Before Whom?   
 The historical order in which groups studied in research programs may affect the focus 
of explanations of group differences. Early 20th century psychological scientists in the United 
States drew attention to the institutional locations of some of their research participants (e.g., 
hospitals, prisons, and schools). But over time, the institutional location of university student 
participants was mentioned with less frequency (Danziger, 1990). We might understand this 
process to have put in motion a kind of disciplinary power in psychological science as the 
particulars of college students become invisible whilst other, less privileged groups remained 
marked as particular.    
 We are, of course, not the first to mention the over-reliance of psychological science on 
college student participants (e.g., Henry, 2008; McNemar, 1940; Sears, 1986).  Here, we 
emphasize how the historical order in which groups are sampled within a research program 
can affect the form that explanation of group differences takes (see also Sue, 1999).  We have 
conducted experiments in which British college students and older adults were presented with 
data about one group, and then asked to consider whether the findings would generalize to a 
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second group.  In the domains of nationality (Hegarty & Chryssochoou, 2005), age 
(Robinson & Hegarty, 2005), and gender (Hegarty, 2006), the resulting explanations of 
predicted group differences focused on the second-sampled group, or ‘the effect to be 
predicted.‘  
 Psychologists are increasingly cognizant of how the knowledge base of psychological 
science rests disproportionately on WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, 
Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) settings.  Consequently our experiments 
on generalization and explanation suggest that psychologists are more likely to consider 
patterns observed outside the WEIRD world as the phenomena that require explanation in 
cross-cultural research (Adams & Salter, 2007). Indeed, the often resulting practice of 
exporting research and interventions based on WEIRD settings to the rest of the world can be 
seen as a new form of colonial power that might in subtle ways contribute to global 
inequalities (Adams, Bruckmüller, & Decker, 2012).  
 There are at least two reasons why people focus explanations of differences on social 
groups that are studied later or about whom we  make a prediction.  The first explanation 
derives from Gricean pragmatics. According to Grice (1975), one of the cooperative norms 
that govern conversation is that speakers should only include necessary information, whilst 
information that can be assumed to be "common ground" - such as  default group identities - 
should not be mentioned explicitly.  Consistent with this model, people are more likely to 
mention explicitly the race or gender of a celebrity in the course of communicating who that 
person might be when they believe that their communication partner might not already have 
that race or gender identity in mind (Pratto, Korchmaros, & Hegarty, 2007). Conversational 
norms for marking can also be set implicitly between partners, as when people look to 
conversation partners for evidence of social norms of when they should or should not 
mention social identities explicitly (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008).  Importantly, 
what people make explicit in conversation and what remains implicit is not only influenced 
by what is assumed to be common ground, it also (re-)establishes common ground (Kashima, 
Klein, & Clark, 2007).  We would argue that conversations among researchers likely have a 
similar form, as socialization into an academic discipline requires learning tacit rules for 
conduct as well as explicit methodologies (Kuhn, 1970).  Researchers may socialize each 
other into traditions that “ground” the norm of focusing explanations on lower-status groups,  
while higher status groups just are. 
 A second explanation of why we focus more on the attributes of groups representing 
"the-effect-to-be-predicted" could be derived from Sloman’s (1993) model of feature-based 
induction. This connectionist model predicts that when people consider whether it is possible 
to generalize from category A to category B, only the distinct features of category B, and not 
the distinct features of category A, affect their judgment. Consistent with Sloman’s model, 
people considering the generalizability of findings call to mind the distinct attributes of 
groups to whom they might generalize, rather than groups from which the original data are 
drawn.  Consequently, people consider out-groups and in-groups to be more similar when 
generalizing from in-groups (of which many distinct attributes are known)  to out-groups (of 
which fewer distinct attributes are known)  than when generalizing from out-groups to in-
groups (Hegarty & Chryssochoou, 2005).  In sum, there are both communicative and 
cognitive explanations of why we tend to focus explanations of group differences on those 
groups who are considered ‘particular’ rather than those who we habitually consider 
normative, by virtue of our sampling habits. 
 
 Which Groups Do We Encounter Frequently?  
 Frequency may be a second factor that skews explanation content. More frequently-
encountered groups may become the background in explanations, and more rarely-
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encountered groups the ‘figure’ of such explanations because of attentional shifts that occur 
during category learning (Kruschke, 2003). Consider the inverse base-rate effect described by 
Medin and Edelson (1988).  These authors asked participants to learn about diseases which 
were presented either frequently or rarely, and the diseases had both common symptoms and 
distinct symptoms.  Participants later inferred which disease was present on a symptom 
common to both diseases.  In such trials, participants typically guessed the more common 
disease.  However, when demanded to guess which disease was indicated by the presence of 
two distinct symptoms, participants typically guessed the less frequently presented disease. 
This inverse base rate effect shows how common features become more readily associated 
with frequently-encountered categories whilst distinct features become more strongly 
associated with rarely-encountered categories during category learning.   
 The inverse base-rate effect may partially account for explanations of group differences 
that reference distinct features of statistically rarer groups more often than they reference 
distinct features of statistically more common groups. Indeed this focus of attention on 
statistical minority groups is attenuated in experiments where participants are told that a 
majority of the sample has been drawn from the statistically minority lower-status group (see 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, Experiment 2 on sexuality, and Pratto,  Hegarty et al., 2007, Study 1, 
on race).  However, not all higher-status groups are statistical majorities; there are fewer 
adult men than women in most populations, and elites are statistical minorities.  Other 
processes must also affect the framing of explanations. 
 
 Which Groups are Implicitly More Prototypical?   
 A third reason why explanations might focus on lower-status groups is that such groups 
are not perceived as being as prototypical of larger social categories as are higher-status 
groups. There is ample evidence that people sometimes conflate the attributes of all with the 
attributes of higher-status groups (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Eagly & Kite, 1987).  
Consider the case of ‘androcentrism’ through which men and the attributes associated with 
them are taken as the standard for humanity (see Hegarty, Parslow, Ansara & Quick, in press 
for a review).   As Simon and Oakes (2006) note, higher status groups often deliberately 
conflate their particular high-status identities and interests with the identities and interests of 
all, to successfully appropriate the efforts of lower-status groups.  Kahneman and Miller’s 
(1986) norm theory describes how people construct mental representations of (social) 
categories called ‘category norms’ that might similarly conflate the attributes of higher-status 
groups with the general category.  Category norms are constructed on-the-fly when category 
labels are invoked. These category norms aggregate the attributes of category members that 
are called to mind when the category label is invoked (so-called 'exemplars').  These authors 
specified both that prototypical members of the category would be most often brought to 
mind and that situational factors might affect the range of exemplars brought to mind.  Thus, 
higher-status groups may be more likely to be the background than the figure in explanations 
because those groups are more prototypical within most social categories. This explanation 
implies that figure-ground relationships in explanations should vary at least somewhat across 
contexts. In support of this hypothesis, explanations focus less on women when gender 
differences within a female-generic category are explained (such as elementary school 
teachers, Miller et al., 1991; Experiment 3), and differences between gay and straight men 
within a category for which gay men are the most prototypical (e.g., men living with 
HIV/AIDS) do not prompt the usual focus of explanations on gay men (Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001, Study 2).  
 In sum, both professional psychological scientists and laypeople may explain group 
differences in asymmetric ways because they are influenced by a history of focusing attention 
on disempowered groups that has given rise to the psychological disciplines (Foucault, 
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1975/1995),  and which may be reproduced as common ground within those disciplines.  
Cognitive psychology suggests why explanatory attention tends to focus on the distinct 
attributes of groups that are studied more recently (Sloman, 1993); encountered less 
frequently (Medin & Edelson), or are taken to be less prototypical of overarching social 
categories (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  We next turn to the question of how such 
explanation asymmetries can empower and disempower groups  and reproduces status 
differences.  
 
Communicating Power by Framing Difference 
 
 In this section we describe empirical findings on the consequences of asymmetric 
explanations and on what information may be (re-)established as common ground when 
explanations focus on either higher-status or lower-status groups. Research in linguistic 
pragmatics demonstrates that sentence structure on its own provides a cue to the 
characteristics of objects.  Gleitman, Gleitman, Miller, and Ostrin (1996, Experiment 5) 
provided their participants with symmetrical statements about nonsense syllables (e.g., “ZUM 
is near GAX”). Participants intuitively inferred that the referent syllable (i.e., GAX) was 
more famous, more important, older, bigger, and less mobile than the subject syllable (i.e., 
ZUM).  Extending these findings from nonsense syllables to more meaningful referents, 
Bruckmüller and Abele (2010) showed that people similarly derive inferences about social 
groups from the position of those groups as figure/subject or ground/referent in comparative 
statements.  Their participants read a text about differences between real groups of similar 
status (i.e., university students with different majors) or fictitious groups, in which one 
(figural) group was always compared to the other (background) group, varying between 
participants which group was figure/subject and which group was ground/referent. 
Participants  inferred that the background group had higher status and more power than the 
figural group, and attributed stereotypes associated with status to the groups in response to 
the comparative framing.  
  In these first studies, the linguistic figure-ground framing was the only available 
information on status. When social groups differ in status this figure-ground framing seems 
to communicate different things about group status depending on the adherence to, or 
violation of, context-specific conventions of framing (Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele, 2012).  
We asked German student participants to read about gender differences framed either in 
terms of how women differ from men or how men differ from women; they either read about 
gender differences in leadership - a domain where men are perceived to be much more 
prototypical than women, often to women's disadvantage (Eagly & Sczesny, 2009) - or about 
gender differences in leisure time, a domain where a pretest had shown women and men to be 
equally prototypical. Among participants reading about gender differences in leadership, 
status differences between men and women were judged to be greater and more legitimate, 
and status-related gender stereotypes were enhanced when gender differences were framed 
conventionally, with women as the figure and men as background.  Varying the framing of 
differences in leisure time use had less systematic effects on gender stereotypes and beliefs 
about status.  
 Thus, for groups that differ in status the choice of which group to figure and which to 
background seems to only affect beliefs about status in contexts where shared assumptions 
about prototypicality and associated conventions for framing differences exist.  Adhering to 
these conventions re-establishes the assumed common ground on status and prototypicality, 
whilst violating conventions of framing seems to challenge these assumptions. 
There are additional implications of asymmetric explanations. First, because people draw 
upon stereotypes to explain differences, stereotypes about lower-status groups are 'aired' 
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more often than are stereotypes about higher-status groups (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Second, 
the framing of group differences can affect the way group members feel about their social 
identity (i.e., their collective self-esteem). In recent studies singles and people in relationships 
read or wrote either about how singles differ from coupled people or the reverse 
(Bruckmüller, in press). Singles - an often stigmatized lower-status group (DePaulo & 
Morris, 2006) - indicated that they felt better about being single when coupled people were 
compared against a background norm of singles than when singles were compared to coupled 
people, irrespective of how positive or negative the respective statements about singles were. 
In a parallel study, left-handed participants felt better about being left-handed when they 
wrote about how right-handers differ from left-handers than when they wrote about how left-
handers differ from right-handers.  There were no effects of framing for coupled or for right-
handed participants. Thus being 'singled out' because of one's membership in a lower-status 
or statistical minority group can negatively affect one's collective self-esteem even if the 
stereotypes that are aired are positive.   
 Taken together, these studies suggest dynamic feedback loops by which status 
differences and habits of framing group differences mutually reinforce each other. Beliefs 
about status (and prototypicality) affect how we frame group differences, and the way we 
frame differences in turn not only reinforces these beliefs and associated stereotypes but also 
affects the way we feel about ourselves.   
 
Future Directions 
 
 Although the work of the philosopher-historian Michel Foucault engaged continually 
with the history of psychology, and that work has had profound influence on many 
disciplines, psychologists have been slow to engage his descriptions of ‘power-knowledge’ 
processes by which social power works through scientific descriptions of people.  In this 
paper, we have suggested that there is evidence that disciplinary power still works to 
disempower people by making them visible, and that such power works through 
psychological science itself.  We reviewed evidence of a widespread tendency to explain 
group differences as being about lower-status groups, described communicative and cognitive 
dynamics that sustain these patterns and described their consequences for the people so 
described.  In conclusion, we point to future directions for this research. 
 First, Foucault’s theory and early work on asymmetric explanations may both be overly 
simplistic in assuming that visibility always leads people to be normalized.  Foucault 
assumed that disciplinary power served to bring individuals conduct closer to a social norm.  
Similarly, Miller et al. (1991) argued that explanations focus on less prototypical groups 
because they are perceived to have more mutable attributes.  However, later studies did not 
replicate Miller et al.’s mutability effect (Pratto, Hegarty et al., 2007), and Gleitman et al. 
(1996) also found that the inference that background syllables were more immobile than 
figural syllables was independent of inferences of importance, size, age and fame.  This 
pattern of results suggests that asymmetric explanations may at least sometimes simply be the 
result of trying to make sense of and to effectively communicate about group differences in a 
socio-cultural context that privileges certain groups as the default - with the unintended 
consequence of reaffirming these privileges.   
  Second, both Foucault’s account of disciplinary power and Kahneman and Miller’s 
(1986) norm theory assume that normalization is based on prototypical features. The idea of 
the ‘normal’ was first used to describe differences among people only in the sciences of the 
late 18th century (Canguilhem, 1966/1989), and Foucault’s account of normalization 
describes well the explosion of statistical thinking in the early 19th century in which 
Bourgeois groups in many new nations produced an avalanche of statistics about the features 
ASYMMETRIC EXPLANATIONS 
8 
of their ‘populations’ (Hacking, 1990).  During this period, deviations from average patterns 
were constructed as a threat to Bourgeois power and social stability in new nation states.  
Historians of statistics also emphasize a second wave of post-Darwinian thinking about 
norms and standards exemplified by eugenics (Hacking, 1990; Gigerenzer et al., 1989).  This 
later form of Galtonian normalization aimed at improving the population of nation states 
through artificial interventions, and held up rare kinds of people as ideal standards for the 
rest of us (e.g., Galton, 1869).   Foucault’s description of normalization and disciplinary 
power does not capture this latter process of Galtonian normalization very well (Hegarty, 
2013).  
 Similarly, Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) norm theory assumes that category norms are 
assembled from the most common features of exemplars that are called to mind to represent 
the category.  Of course, a ‘category norm’ is only a metaphor; there is nothing cognitively 
natural about a ‘norm,’ and like many metaphors in cognitive psychology, norm theory draws 
on statistical practices for its inspiration (c.f., Gigerenzer, 1991). Not all categories have 
common features at their centre.  Mental norms for many natural categories revolve around 
average ‘best exemplars’ (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), whilst many human-made goal-directed 
categories include uncommon ideal cases as their best exemplars (Barsalou, 1985).   
Research on asymmetric explanations has not yet examined how people explain differences 
between ordinary people and rare people who are sometimes considered ideal, such as the 
very rich, very beautiful, very moral, or very intelligent.  
 Finally, neither Foucualt’s account of power, nor norm theory, assumes that power 
simply expresses individual or group interests (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  Research has found 
gender similarities in the ways that women and men focus attention in explaining gender 
differences (Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty & Buechel, 2006; Miller et al., 1991), suggesting that 
lower- and higher-status groups may contribute to the justification of unfair social systems by 
the way they explain group differences.  However, it also seems plausible that members of 
lower-status groups will shift their worldviews away from dominant perspectives that 
position their group identities as different-from-the-norm as their social identities develop 
(Cross, 1991), or they collectively form ‘cognitive alternatives’ to the prevailing status quo 
(Reicher & Haslam, 2006).  Again, it is likely that lower-status groups define themselves as 
different, but for different motivations than higher-status groups.  Whilst our work on 
linguistic framing has found little evidence of effects of group identity on explanation 
content, there are suggestive findings that people engage with science in ways that are 
affected by social identity concerns  (e.g., Hegarty, Lemieux, & McQueen, 2010; Morton, 
Haslam, Postmes, & Ryan, 2006). More work is needed on this question of how the focus of 
attention might shift when people explain group differences as individuals, and when they 
explain group differences as members of higher- and lower-status social groups.   
 In conclusion, we hope that we have raised awareness of an ongoing practice in our 
science, a practice that we would be loath to call a ‘bias’ because that would suggest that we 
know what an ‘unbiased’ position on group differences would be.  At this point in its history, 
psychology must wrestle with its legacy of constructing quite skewed universal theories 
based on a narrow data base from WEIRD people.  Our research suggests that we will not 
have egalitarian theory simply by recruiting more diverse people into our studies, as 
differences between groups are too readily attributed to unfamiliar groups, often in 
pathologizing ways (Adams & Salter, 2007).  In addition, psychologists need to devote 
conscious effort to think about what is particular about WEIRD societies.  By describing the 
dynamics of disciplinary power in such societies, and the continued focus on lower-status 
groups in explanation in those societies, we hope to have contributed to such theoretical 
refinement. Asymmetric accounts of difference are common, psychologists construct them, 
and they have consequences for people. Forming cognitive alternatives to these accounts of 
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difference is necessarily a collective task.  Elsewhere, one of us has suggested some concrete 
ways that psychologists might work against these effects (Hegarty, 2007).  These include not 
only changing the framing of our explanations and particularizing the characteristics of 
'normative' groups,  but also being more cautious about the order in which we graph groups, 
the metaphors that we draw upon from the social world to structure understanding of, and 
communication about abstract phenomena, and supporting other scientists whose work breaks 
those incumbent norms for representation. We urge you to engage in these and other practices 
that will change the ways that psychologists represent diverse people, and to continue to 
develop the knowledge base about the ways that representations of group differences affect 
people.  
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